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Joseph Zahner

Suspicionless Searches of Students in Public Schools

The application of constitutional rights to states and individuals has expanded in the
Twentieth Century. On the heels of that expansion, the courts began to convey some of those
rights to children, who had previously held a protected status, shielded from both criminal
liability and many of the constitutional rights enjoyed by adults. A dilemma was created in our
public schools. A tension developed, which persists today. A tension between limiting the
unconstitutional intrusion of public schools into the lives of our children, and those very same
schools standing in loco parentis, helping to protect the health, safety and welfare of the children
we entrust to them.
This article examines this dilemma and asks the question of whether the doctrine of in loco
parentis in public schools is in jeopardy and how this affects parental choices. Specifically, it
examines the application of the Fourth Amendment to the maintenance of safe and drug-free
schools. Can our schools get away with suspicionless searches? Will random drug tested
expand or contract? Does random testing work to ameliorate drug use? What role do parents
have in demanding that schools provide a drug free environment or protect the rights of our
children?
Constitutional Rights of Children
With the advent of the progressive movement, children began to acquire special status in
American society. In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the federal
government embraced the idea that children are a distinct group requiring special treatment. The
juvenile justice system was developed to shield children from harsh legal treatment and to foster
rehabilitation.
By the 1960s, an era of significant social change and the rise of youth culture, the children’s
rights movement took hold. Child protection became viewed as an infringement on children’s
2
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rights. The question emerged: Are children entitled to the same fundamental constitutional rights
as adults?
The Supreme Court laid the groundwork for the children’s rights movement in 1943, during
the height of our war against fascism.1 In West Virginia State Board Of Education v. Barnette, a
group of students refused to participate in the pledge of allegiance (asserting religious beliefs)
and sought to enjoin the school from forcing students to participate on threat of expulsion of the
student and prosecution of the parents for causing delinquency. The district court barred the
school from forcing students to participate in the flag salute, and the Supreme Court affirmed
that decision. The school board argued that the flag salute was essential to build national unity.
Justice Jackson in his majority opinion stated, “That [the schools] are educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we
are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes.”2 Free speech was thus recognized for students.
Having established that fundamental constitutional rights are applicable to public school
children, a line of cases began to refine the application. In the seminal 1965 Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District decision, the Supreme Court reinforced students’ rights to
free speech in public school.3 During the early days of the Vietnam War, the Tinker children
wore black armbands to school in protest of the war. The school suspended the students for
disrupting the school. The Tinkers sued to enjoin the school from disciplining the students, but
the district court, while acknowledging the symbolic speech of the armbands as protected speech,
held that the school’s actions were reasonable to maintain discipline. The circuit court upheld
1

W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943)
Id. at 637.
3
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731
(1969)
2
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the decision. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, having found that “there is no finding
and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.’” 4
The majority argued, “[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute
regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear.
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of
another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must
take this risk ….”5 Thus, the defense of students’ fundamental constitutional rights was well on
its way in the late 1960s.
The protection of first amendment rights of students in public schools is easily defensible.
Parents generally cannot complain too much about schools permitting the free exchange of ideas
among students and faculty. After all, our children are learning the fundamentals of American
law and the rights of citizens in a free society. The application of the first amendment fits neatly
into a parent’s expectation of schools acting in loco parentis.
We run into trouble, however, when the application of constitutional restrictions on public
schools begins to erode our expectation that schools provide a safe and healthy learning
environment. The dilemma is that our schools serve as caretakers of our children. They stand in
loco parentis. Public schools are also the state, and therefore subject to constitutional restraint
according to the fourteenth amendment. Can we strike a balance, or walk a fine line between
student welfare and their ostensible constitutional rights? Can we have the best of both worlds?

4
5

Id. at 509.
Id. at 508.
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History of the Fourth Amendment

Should the government be permitted without a warrant, probable cause, or suspicion to
search an individual and collect personal information from her for the purpose of discipline or
corrective measures? I think most of us would say no. If, however, we dissect this question a bit
further and ask whether our schools be able to test our students for illicit drug use in an effort to
keep drugs out of schools, some parents would say yes, and some would say no. What if we
apply a reasonableness standard? More parents would probably say yes.
Next ask yourself, as a parent, would you prefer that the school randomly test a selected
group of some students, all students, or only those students suspected of doing drugs? This is a
much tougher question to answer, depending on whether you believe that random testing is an
effective deterrent or not; or whether you believe that your school has a drug problem that needs
to be addressed.
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”6 The Fourth Amendment put an end to the
English and early American writs of assistance, which permitted government officers to enter
any establishment or home to seek smuggled goods. The early Americans were distrustful of
government intrusion and arbitrary action and sought to protect their right to privacy.7 Keep in
mind that this article was enacted before modern police forces and duly organized government
investigative agencies were established. The Fourth Amendment chilled arbitrary and capricious
6

USCA CONST Amend. IV
Shannon O'Pry, A Constitutional Mosh Pit: The Fourth Amendment, Suspicionless Searches,
and the Toughest Public School Drug Testing Policy in America, 33 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 151, 159
(2001)
7
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searches and seizures of police and investigators. Under the Fourth Amendment, if an
investigator, having reasonable suspicion, could show probable cause to a distanced and arguably
disinterested magistrate, that magistrate could issue a warrant permitting the search. The citizen
is protected from arbitrary government search and seizure.
The operative phrase in the Fourth Amendment is protection against unreasonable search and
seizure. The showing of probable cause, and the issuance of a warrant exhibit the highest form
of reasonableness.8 Under the probable cause standard, the “task of the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.”9 However, to be lawful, a search merely need be reasonable
and not even rise to probable cause.
It is common knowledge in our society that the police must obtain a warrant to search the
home of a suspected thief or drug dealer. But is a search warrant required for the inspection of
an apartment building for housing violations, or a meat packing plant for health violations? Must
the government, in these administrative inspections, obtain a warrant based upon probable cause
of a violation? The answer is a resounding …, maybe.
The court grappled with this idea. In Frank v. State of Maryland, the court upheld the
conviction of a Baltimore City man who refused to allow city health inspectors to enter his home
without a warrant to search for vermin. The inspectors were responding to credible reports by
neighbors that rats were swarming the home. The Supreme Court held that the search was based
on legitimate evidence of filth. It was important that the inspector was not permitted by law to
8

Camara v. Mun. Court of City & County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 535, 87 S. Ct. 1727,
1734, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967)
9
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)
6
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force his way into a home, and that the privacy interests of the homeowner were respected during
the search.10
In 1967, the court overturned Frank in its famous Camara decision.11 A San Francisco
apartment owner refused to allow a city housing inspector into his building without a warrant.
The inspection was routine, and the inspector returned several times but was denied access each
time. The apartment owner was arrested for refusing the inspection. The court held that the
warrantless inspection was unconstitutional because there was no emergency, and the inspector
had plenty of opportunity to secure a warrant.12 Although the court established the rule that a
warrantless inspection of a building by city inspectors without consent is unconstitutional, it
nonetheless developed a new balancing test for administrative searches, the “Camara Test”. The
government’s “special need” to prevent hazards to public health and safety must be balanced
against the individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy.13
The Camara Test was further revised a year later by the landmark Terry v. Ohio case.14 In
Terry, a police officer, suspecting that a crime was about to be committed by a group of
suspicious men, stopped and frisked the men. The police officer searched the outer garments of
the suspect, Mr. Terry, and discovered illegal guns. Here, Mr. Terry argued that the discovered
weapons were inadmissible, due to lack of probable cause for arrest. The Supreme Court,
however, held that the search and seizure was constitutional because it was reasonable, even
without ant apparent probable cause for an arrest.
The court determined that the detective had sufficient reason to believe that a robbery was
about to occur and that Mr. Terry and his cohorts were armed. Out of fear for the detective’s and
10

Frank v. State of Md., 359 U.S. 360, 366-67, 79 S. Ct. 804, 809, 3 L. Ed. 2d 877 (1959)
Camara, at 540
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)
11
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others safety, and based upon reasonable suspicion, the police could lawfully frisk the suspect in
the absence of probable cause for an arrest (a “Terry Stop”). A “search for weapons in the
absence of probable cause to arrest … must [nonetheless] … be strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies which justify its initiation … [and] limited to that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby….”15
This line of cases lays out those circumstances in which the government may search someone
without probably cause and without a warrant. In Terry, the court set on a path to establish those
“special needs” of the state that allow search and seizure without probable cause. Warrantless
but nonetheless reasonable searches were soon allowed in those situations in which the special
needs of the government outweigh an individual’s reduced expectation of privacy. Terry forces
us to ask the question of whether the search was reasonable. Was the search justified at its
inception? Was the search reasonably related to its goal? In Terry the goal was to determine
whether the suspect had dangerous weapons.
The principles derived from Terry and the modified Camara Test were applied in yet another
landmark Supreme Court case, New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985).16 This is a public school case and is
particularly important for establishing public schools as state actors subject to the restraints of
the Fourth Amendment. Two 14-year-old girls were discovered smoking cigarettes in the public
school restroom and sent to the principal’s office. T.L.O., when questioned by the vice principal,
admitted to violating the non-smoking rule but denied smoking in the bathroom at that particular
time. The vice principal opened T.L.O.’s purse and discovered a pack of cigarettes. After he
removed the cigarettes, he noticed rolling papers and suspected marijuana use. Based upon his
suspicion, the vice principal dug further into T.L.O.’s purse and discovered “a small amount of
15
16

Id. at 25-26.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985).
8

Joseph Zahner

Suspicionless Searches of Students in Public Schools

marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar
bills, an index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters
that implicated T.L.O. in marihuana dealing.” The police and T.L.O’s mother were notified.
T.L.O. subsequently confessed to selling marijuana, and her confession and the evidence
discovered by the vice principal were used as the basis for delinquency charges.
The New Jersey juvenile court denied T.L.O.’s motion to suppress the evidence and, while
applying the Fourth Amendment to the school, held that the search was nonetheless reasonable.
The appeals court agreed that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred, but the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search was unreasonable. The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari and held the school to be subject to the Fourth Amendment, but held that the
search itself was reasonable and therefore constitutional.17
T.L.O. in dicta claims to represent a departure from the jurisprudence of in loco parentis to
that of the Fourth Amendment. In the majority opinion, Justice White stated, “In carrying out
searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act as
representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the
parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”18 The court, however, applies
what is arguably a watered down approach in its determination of what it considers a reasonable
search. It balanced “the schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s equally
legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place.”19 Here, the Terry
standard is applied, which allows reasonable searches to be conducted below the standard of
probable cause, but in this case no life-or-death or property-loss emergency exists.

17

Id. at 347.
Id. at 336-337 (emphasis added).
19
Id. at 340.
18
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The court tries to strike a balance between permitting the school to continue to function in
loco parentis, while paying lip service to the Fourth Amendment. Justice White opined that
“requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of
school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift
and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”20 The court strikes a compromise
of sorts by applying the Terry standard, which “neither unduly burden[s] the efforts of school
authorities to maintain order in their schools nor authorize[s] unrestrained intrusions upon the
privacy of schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the question of reasonableness, the standard
will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of
reason and common sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard should ensure that the
interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of
preserving order in the schools.”21 Clearly the court seeks to preserve as much of the status of
schools as caretaker of children, while inserting a modicum of Fourth Amendment restraint.
The court applied Terry to justify the search. Interestingly, the application of the
reasonableness standard according to Terry is analogous to the standard a parent might apply to
its child. The court applied the following test. First, was the search “justified at its inception”?22
Any parent detecting cigarette smoke emanating from the bathroom is justified in searching his
child’s purse. Second, was “the search as actually conducted … reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place” and not excessively
intrusive?23 Again, any reasonable parent searching for evidence to support the conclusion that
20

Id.
Id. at 342-43.
22
Id. at 341-42.
23
Id.
21
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his child was smoking would not intrude excessively (i.e., no strip search or tearing apart a
child’s bedroom), but would merely search for the cigarettes. Any reasonable parent upon
discovering of drug paraphernalia would reasonably attempt to find more evidence to support a
conclusion of drug involvement. The key here, the court says, is that the inception of the search
was justified and the follow-up search reasonable in scope.
The cornerstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is the individual’s legitimate
expectation of privacy. In their concurrence, Justices Powell and O’Connor asserted that
students in a “school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the
population generally … [and that] teachers have a degree of familiarity with, and authority over,
their students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child.”24
Here, the court appears to state outright that schools, while being the government, nonetheless
continue to enjoy a special status of standing in loco parentis.
Interestingly, the T.L.O. court seems to set the stage for the eventual allowance of random
drug testing in schools. In T.L.O., the search was based upon reasonable suspicion. The court,
however, went out of its way to tell us that “the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
requirement of such suspicion ... Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are
generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and
where ‘other safeguards’ are available ‘to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy is not ‘subject to the discretion of the official in the field.’”25 These words herald the
coming of random suspicionless searches in the public schools.

24
25

Id at 348.
Id at 385.
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The Advent of Suspicionless Searches
Can the state search an individual, not only without probable cause, but also without any
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing? Yes, but within certain limits, which remove the discretion
of the investigator and avoid the danger of arbitrariness. Random searches are constitutional as
long as there is a compelling government interest at stake.
The state of Delaware in the 1970s passed a law allowing police to stop vehicles to check for
proper licensing and registration. The state justified the law as promoting its legitimate interest
to ensure the safety of its roadways. In Delaware v. Prouse, the state argued that this interest out
weighed any intrusion of motorists’ privacy.26 Mr. Prouse was pulled over by a Delaware
patrolman, who noticed the smell of marijuana, and observed marijuana in plain view. The
patrolman seized the marijuana. At trial, Mr. Prouse moved to suppress the evidence as unlawful
under the Fourth Amendment. The patrolman testified that he “was not acting pursuant to any
standards, guidelines, or procedures pertaining to document spot checks, promulgated by either
his department or the State Attorney General”, but that the stop was nonetheless routine.27 The
trial court held that the “stop and detention [were] wholly capricious and therefore violative of
the Fourth Amendment.”28
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s suppression of the evidence, holding that
“stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the
registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”, unless “there is at
least articulable and reasonable suspicion that the motorist is unlicensed.”29 The court, however,
26

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979)
Id at 650.
28
Id at 651.
29
Id at 663.
27
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failed to provide guidance as to what would constitute a constitutional suspicionless search.
“[M]ethods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained
exercise of discretion[, such as the] questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops”
would be considered not violative of the Fourth Amendment.30 Here the court appears to
sanction the constitutionality of non-selected searches, when the special needs of the government
outweigh the legitimate but reduced privacy expectations of the individual. This non-selectivity
aspect (in some cases random, in other cases everyone within a specific narrow group) removes
the arbitrariness and capriciousness of suspicionless searches.
An early test of the suspicionless drug test was in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n. Under the Railroad Safety Act of 1970, the Federal Railroad Administration promulgated
rules requiring railroads to test blood and urine of workers involved in railway accidents. When
a significant accident occurs, such as one involving loss of life, or over $500,000 in damages, or
the release of hazardous materials, the workers involved are required to be tested for drugs and
alcohol, regardless of any individualized suspicion. A worker could also be subjected to a drug
or alcohol test if two supervisors suspected the worker of being impaired. The testing involves
breath tests, urine tests, or blood tests. If a positive result is discovered, the individual is notified
and given an opportunity to respond.31 The Railway Labor Executives Association sued to
enjoin the implementation of these rules.
The district court granted the petition, and held that the regulations violated the Fourth
Amendment privacy rights of the workers. The court of appeals reversed in part, and held that
the emergent nature of the problem required prompt action, thus precluding a warrant. The
appeals court also held that the significant safety concerns of the government outweighed any
30

Id.
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 609, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1409, 103 L. Ed.
2d 639 (1989).
31

13

Joseph Zahner

Suspicionless Searches of Students in Public Schools

privacy interests of the workers, thereby obviating the probable cause standard.32 The circuit
court nonetheless held that particularized suspicion was still required, and rejected the
suspicionless part of the regulations. The second part of the regulations, the suspicion-based
part, was held to be constitutional.
The Supreme Court confirmed that the “compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood” and
“the chemical analysis of [either the urine or blood] to obtain physiological data” are deemed a
Fourth Amendment search and an “invasion of the tested employee's privacy interests.”33 The
court weighed the test’s “intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against [the]
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”34 It considered the government’s interest in
promoting railroad worker safety as a “special need” that justifies departure from the warrant and
probable-cause requirements.35 The court reasoned that, under the warrant procedures, the
magistrate functions to protect the privacy interests of the individual by narrowly constraining
the scope of the search. Here, the regulations themselves were deemed to have narrowly
constrained the situation in which the search occurs, rendering moot the need for the
magistrate.36
Most importantly, the Skinner court allowed suspicionless searches to be conducted by the
government. The majority argued “a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional
floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable but in circumstances] where the
privacy interests … are minimal, and where an important governmental interest … would be

32

Id. at 613.
Id. at 616-17.
34
Id. at 619.
35
Id. at 620.
36
Id. at 622.
33
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placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable
despite the absence of such suspicion.”37 The Skinner decision is just the beginning.
The constitutionality of suspicionless drug tests was further expanded in National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, which was decided on the same day as Skinner. The United
States Customs Service establishing a rule requiring an individual seeking a position having
direct involvement in drug interdiction or any position that required carrying a firearm to first
pass a drug test. The federal employee’s union petitioned the district court for an injunction
against enforcing the rule, which the court granted. The circuit court vacated the lower court’s
decision, stating that the search was reasonable given the government’s strong interest in
detecting drug use in those covered situations, and in view of the narrow scope of application.38
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, reasoning that the compelling government
interest in deterring drug use among those in the covered positions outweighed the reduced
expectation of privacy of the individuals.39 Regarding the legitimate expectation of privacy of
the workers, the court reasoned that “Customs employees who are directly involved in the
interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in the line of duty likewise
have a diminished expectation of privacy in respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test.
Unlike most private citizens or government employees in general, employees involved in drug
interdiction reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness and probity. Much the
same is true of employees who are required to carry firearms. Because successful performance of
their duties depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity, these employees cannot

37

Id. at 624.
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 663, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1389, 103
L. Ed. 2d 685 (1989)
39
Id. at 666.
38
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reasonably expect to keep from the Service personal information that bears directly on their
fitness.”40
Justices Scalia and Stevens argued in the dissent that, unlike the case in Skinner, the facts
here did not support a persistent dangerous alcohol and drug problem in the Customs Service or
the covered positions. According to Justice Scalia, “neither frequency of use [of drugs] nor
connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely” in this case.41 Von Raab represents the
softening of what is to be considered a compelling government interest, and a lowering of the bar
for what may be considered the “special needs” of government, according to the dissent.
Suspicionless Searches in Public Schools
We have seen the application of fundamental constitutional rights to students in the
classroom, while witnessing the erosion of the probable cause standard for search and seizure.
On the one hand, schools have become restricted in their censure of student’s free speech and
subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. On the other hand, we have seen the
acceptance of suspicionless and warrantless searches by the government, and the lowering of the
bar as to what is considered a special need of the government. So where does this leave us as far
as a student’s expectation of privacy in public schools?
In the mid-1980s, the sleepy logging town of Vernonia, Oregon, faced what it considered to
be a drug crisis. Parents and teachers observed a marked increase in drug use and a more than
two-fold increase in the number of disciplinary problems in the schools. They documented
significant drug use among student athletes. Several sports injuries were attributed to drug use.
Concerned about the health, safety and well being of the children charged to its care, the school
40
41

Id. at 672.
Id. at 681.
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district responded by increasing drug education programs and employing drug sniffing dogs on
state property. The problem nonetheless continued to worsen.
The Vernonia school district considered implementing a drug testing policy and floated the
idea across the community. The parents unanimously approved. The Student Athlete Drug
Policy was implemented in the fall of 1989, the stated purpose of which was to “prevent student
athletes from using drugs, to protect their health and safety, and to provide drug users with
assistance programs.”42 The policy required students wishing to participate in extra-curricular
athletics to submit to a pre-season drug test, and consent to random drug testing throughout the
athletic season. Each month, ten percent of the athletes were to be randomly selected for testing.
No non-random selection method was permitted to be used.
Here, the urine sample is obtained from the student in discreet a manner as practicable. In
the case of males, the student remains clothed with his back to the monitor. In the case of
females, the student enters a private stall, and the monitor remains outside the stall. Samples are
labeled with an anonymous number and the key is kept with the school administration. Strict
chain of custody protocol is followed. If a student tests positive, he or she is given a second test.
If the second test is negative, that student is deemed to have passed the test. If the student fails
the drug test, his or her “parents are notified, and the school principal convenes a meeting with
the student and his [or her] parents, at which the student is given the option of (1) participating
for six weeks in an assistance program that includes weekly urinalysis, or (2) suffering
suspension from athletics for the remainder of the current season and the next athletic season.”43
In 1991, seventh grader James Acton signed up for football at one of the grade schools. He
refused to subject himself to the urinalysis and was denied access to the football program. He
42

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564
(1995).
43
Id. at 651.
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petitioned the district court to enjoin implementation of the policy, which the district court
denied. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. 44
The Supreme Court applied its “special needs” analysis of T.L.O. to the rubrick of Skinner and
Von Raab and reversed the circuit court.
In its special needs analysis, the Supreme Court applied three factors. The first factor
examined whether the degree of intrusiveness of the search violated the legitimate expectation of
privacy of the individual. The first factor was analyzed in two elements: the nature of the
relationship between the searcher and the one being searched; and the degree to which the
voluntary nature of the act can reduce the individual’s expectation of privacy. The second factor
examined whether the government’s interest in the search was sufficiently compelling. The third
factor, based upon the exigency of the situation, examined whether the need was immediate and
whether other less intrusive but equally effective methods were available. The fourth factor
examined whether the government acted arbitrarily, by asking whether the search was justified at
its inception, as in T.L.O., and whether the target and scope of the search were sufficiently and
justifiably narrow.45
The Supreme Court seemed to focus here on the reduced legitimate expectation of privacy
suffered by student athletes. Student athletes invariably share locker rooms and shower stalls
and thererfore, the court argued, “legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to
student athletes…. Public school locker rooms … are not notable for the privacy they afford.”46
Athletic programs are also voluntary programs. The court reasoned “students who voluntarily
participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges,

44

Id. at 652.
O’Pry, S. (2001) at 174-175.
46
Id. at 657.
45
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including privacy”, not unlike the adults in Skinner “who choose to participate in a ‘closely
regulated industry.’”47
Probably most importantly, the court also considered the special relationship between the
school and the child in its privacy analysis. “Central, in our view, to the present case is the fact
that the subjects of the Policy are (1) children, who (2) have been committed to the temporary
custody of the State as schoolmaster…. When parents place minor children in private schools
for their education, … those schools stand in loco parentis over the children entrusted to them.”48
However, while admitting “children assuredly do not “shed their constitutional rights ... at the
schoolhouse gate,’” the court “acknowledged that for many purposes ‘school authorities ac[t] in
loco parentis.’”49
The court next examined whether the government’s interest was sufficiently compelling to
justify the urinalysis. Citing scientific and medical literature regarding the detrimental effects of
drugs on school age children, and the negative effects of a drug-infested school “upon the entire
student body and faculty”, the court held that the government’s interest in deterring drug use was
“at least as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the
importation of drugs, which was the governmental concern in Von Raab, … or deterring drug use
by engineers and trainmen, which was the governmental concern in Skinner.”50
The court next examined the level of intrusion of the search, in this case, urinalysis. The
privacy of the students was deemed to be optimized (the students remained clothed or shielded in
a stall) and the information obtained was narrowly focused on specific drugs and access to the
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information restricted. Thus the court concluded “that the invasion of privacy was not
significant.”51
Finally, the court examined the nature and immediacy of the problem, and the effectiveness
of the means to address that problem. Quite simply, the majority felt that the drug problem in the
Vernonia school district was “an immediate crisis of greater proportions than [that which]
existed in Skinner.” The court agreed with the trial court, which found that “a large segment of
the student body, particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of
rebellion, that disciplinary actions had reached epidemic proportions, and that the rebellion was
being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as by the student's misperceptions about the drug
culture.”52 But was the urinalysis an appropriate effective means for dealing with this obvious
crisis? That court held that is was.
The court weighed the merits of suspicion-based drug testing, and the narrow application of
the random test, and, interestingly, also considered the views of parents. The court agreed with
parents that a suspicion-based testing program ran the risk of stigmatizing children, while doing
nothing to address the “role model effect” of ensuring that the athletes stay clean. Thus, the
court held that the random suspicionless test was most effective in addressing the problem of
drug use among athletes.53
Scalia, who dissented in Von Raab, wrote the majority opinion in Vernonia. This is
particularly interesting because the facts of Von Raab, which permitted suspicionless drug testing
for situations in which the individuals were volunteering for new positions, is closely analogous
to Vernonia. According to Justice Scalia’s dissent in Von Raab, no significant relevant data was
presented to bolster the government’s assertion that drug use was or could be problematic for the
51
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covered positions. Whereas in Skinner, in which Justice Scalia was in the majority, the
suspicionless tests were administered to workers involved in major accidents where drug use was
linked to health and safety. The drug problem in Skinner was clearly documented and supported.
The facts in Vernonia are most analogous to Von Raab, where no significant evidence is offered
to prove that students volunteering for extra-curricular sports are more prone to illegal drug use
or require to be “cleaner” than other members of the student body. Why Justice Scalia’s about
face here? His arguments are strained as he rationalizes that drugs are especially problematic for
athletes. Perhaps what is really going on here is that the Supreme Court carved out a special
public school exception to the Fourth Amendment, and a renewed bolster to the doctrine of in
loco parentis.
The Vernonia court decided that random suspicionless drug testing of student athletes, who
have a reduced expectation of privacy, was constitutional. In dicta, the court explains that public
schools retain a special status, even though they are state actors and do not “officially” stand in
loco parentis. “But while denying that the State's power over schoolchildren is formally no more
than the delegated power of their parents, T.L.O. did not deny, but indeed emphasized, that the
nature of that power is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that
could not be exercised over free adults.”54 Thus, Vernonia gives us a watered-down Fourth
Amendment right co-extensive with a watered-down application of in loco parentis.
The trend toward preserving parent-like custodial powers of the public schools and the
evisceration of the right to privacy of students under the Fourth Amendment continues. In 2002,
the Supreme Court went even further in carving out a special place for public schools in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. In the 5-4 Earls decision, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority
with Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy and Breyer joining, held that a school need not present
54
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evidence of drug problems in a covered group in order to subject that group to suspicionless drug
testing.55
In 1998, the Tecumseh School District near Oklahoma City established the policy of
requiring all students to submit to random drug testing “before participating in an extracurricular
activity….”56 The extracurricular activities included those “competitive extracurricular activities
sanctioned by the Oklahoma Secondary Schools Activities Association, such as the Academic
Team, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of America, band, choir, pom-pom,
cheerleading, and athletics.”57 The only repercussions of a positive test result were limited to
counseling and suspension from participation in extracurricular activities for a limited time. No
law enforcement authorities were notified, only the parents of the child. The child was not
subject to any academic or disciplinary action.58
Students Lindsay Earls, a member of the choir, the marching band, the Academic Team, and
the National Honor Society, and Daniel James, a member of the Academic Team, sought to
block the implementation of Tecumseh’s policy.59 The District court upheld the policy, but the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Tenth Circuit concluded, before a school district
can implement a suspicionless drug testing program, it must first “demonstrate that there is some
identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those subject to the testing, such
that testing that group of students will actually redress its drug problem.” In this case the school
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district “failed to demonstrate such a problem existed among Tecumseh students participating in
competitive extracurricular activities.”60
The Supreme Court applied the “special needs” doctrine established in T.L.O. and refined in
Von Raab and Vernonia. The respondents argued that the legitimate privacy expectations are
greater for those extracurricular activities that do not involve communal showering, as in this
case compared to Vernonia. The majority conveniently explained, however, that the communal
undress discussion “was not essential to [the] decision in Vernonia, which depended primarily
upon the school's custodial responsibility and authority.” The majority argued that “students
who participate in competitive extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to many
of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes … [, such as] occasional off-campus travel
and communal undress … [, and] a faculty sponsor monitors the students for compliance with the
various rules dictated by the clubs and activities … further diminish[ing] the expectation of
privacy among schoolchildren.”61 The court’s overreaching is difficult to explain as it argues
against its Vernonia precedent, in an effort to extend the suspicionless drug test to more and
more students.
As discussed earlier, the touchstone of legitimate search and seizure is reasonableness. To be
reasonable, a warrantless search must serve an immediate and important government interest
(i.e., “special needs”). The Tenth Circuit in Earls held that the Tecumseh district failed to
present sufficient evidence to support an imminent drug problem specific to the covered group.
The Supreme Court held otherwise. The majority contended, “the School District … presented
specific evidence of drug use at Tecumseh schools. Teachers testified that they had seen students
who appeared to be under the influence of drugs and that they had heard students speaking
60
61
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openly about using drugs…. A drug dog found marijuana cigarettes near the school parking lot.
Police officers once found drugs or drug paraphernalia in a car driven by a Future Farmers of
America member.” This, according to the majority, constituted an immediate drug problem in
the Tecumseh school district requiring the establishment of the drug testing policy.62
Regarding the effectiveness of the broad extracurricular drug testing in Tecumseh, the court
merely waves its hands. “[T]esting students who participate in extracurricular activities is a
reasonably effective means of addressing the School District's legitimate concerns in preventing,
deterring, and detecting drug use.” It argued that the rationale it used in Vernonia, that the
testing of athletes was effective given their status as role models and the group responsible for
much of the drug problem, was “not essential to the holding.”63 Once again, we find the court
selectively ignoring its own prior reasoning to support its present agenda, an agenda that appears
to give public schools wide latitude in controlling student behavior, preserving as much of the
doctrine of in loco parentis.
The majority opinion in Earls and Justice Breyer’s concurrence seem to promote the reemergence of in loco parentis for public schools. According to the majority, “[W]hen the
government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether the search is one that a
reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake”.64 Justice Breyer makes no bones about it,
stating that public schools not only “teach the fundamentals”, but “shoulder the burden of
feeding students breakfast and lunch, offering before and after school child care services, and
providing medical and psychological services…. [which] the law itself recognizes … with the
phrase in loco parentis….”65 Justice Breyer draws our attention to the fact that parents view
62
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schools as having parental-like authority, regardless of whether the school is public or private.
“A public school system that fails adequately to carry out its responsibilities may well see
parents send their children to private or parochial school instead-with help from the State.”66
The dissent is “wise to” the court’s watering-down of reasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment and its rejuvenation of the doctrine of in loco-parentis. Justice Ginsberg
points out that drug risks “are present for all schoolchildren”, not just those participating in
extracurricular activities. “Vernonia cannot be read to endorse invasive and suspicionless drug
testing of all students upon any evidence of drug use, solely because drugs jeopardize the life and
health of those who use them.”67
Perhaps Justice Breyer provides the best argument for this expansion of random testing in
Earls. The voluntary nature of extracurricular activities “preserves an option for a conscientious
objector. He can refuse testing while paying a price (nonparticipation) that is serious, but less
severe than expulsion from the school.” 68 We later see that this “opting-out” doctrine is
essential to the legality of suspicionless drug testing in New Jersey.
When Is a Search Unreasonable?
In Safford v. Redding,69 a search and seizure case based upon reasonable suspicion, the
Supreme Court held the line in 2009 on what is considered an unreasonable breach of privacy.
13-year old Arizona middle-schooler Savana Redding, suspected of selling contraband
ibuprofen, was pulled from her class room and sent to the principal’s office. After a search of
her backpack revealed nothing, Savana was sent to the nurse’s office where her clothing was
66
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searched. Still finding no contraband, the school nurse and an administrative assistant then asked
Savana to pull out her bra and underwear waist band, which partially exposed her breasts and
pubic area. Again nothing was found. Savana sued the school for violating her Fourth
Amendment rights.70 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school
district and the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed, holding that no Fourth Amendment violation
occurred. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc reversed, holding that “the strip search was
unjustified under the Fourth Amendment test for searches of children by school officials set out
in New Jersey v. T.L.O.” 71 ,
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s en banc holding. In doing
so, the court refined the standard set forth in T.L.O., which limits the extent to which a search
may progress under “special needs” doctrine. Central to the court’s reasoning was the fact that
search was severely intrusive, “embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating”; and repugnant to
“Savana's subjective expectation of privacy against such a search….” Her expectation of privacy
against a strip search was reasonable, as “indicated by the consistent experiences of other young
people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of
the exposure.”72 The search violated the standard set forth in T.L.O., which requires that “‘the
search as actually conducted [be] reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place’ [, and that the] scope will be permissible … when it is
‘not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction.’”73 In this case, the court held that “what was missing from the suspected facts that
pointed to Savana was any indication of danger to the students from the … the drugs .., and any
70
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reason to suppose that Savana was carrying pills in her underwear. The combination of those
deficiencies made the search reasonable.”74 Thus, the most recent word from the Supreme Court
on search and seizure of children in public schools is that the danger to the student body must be
sufficiently high to warrant such an intrusive search, and it must be reasonably related to the
scope of finding contraband.
According to Safford, “the content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion.”75
How does this apply to suspicionless searches? Would Earls be decided differently in view of
Safford, or does the court apply a different standard to suspicionless searches? Should we not
apply the standard to suspicionless searches as well? For suspicionless random drug testing,
does the realistic degree of the harm to the student body match the degree of intrusion?
Suspicionless Searches in New Jersey Public Schools
On August 6, 1985, the Carlstadt-East Rutherford School District adopted a policy requiring
yearly on-premises drug screening as part of comprehensive student medical examinations. A
urinalysis would be conducted, and the records kept confidential. The school district would enter
those students with a positive drug result into a drug rehabilitation program. No civil or criminal
penalties would be levied against those students showing a positive result, but the student could
be referred to the Bergen county district office of the Division of Youth and Family Services for
subsequent periodic testing.76
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The school district took the position that the State permitted schools to ensure the physical
fitness of all students, and that medical testing fulfilled that obligation.77 The students and their
parents brought suit, and argued that the suspicionless drug test violated their right against
unreasonable search and seizure. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Bergen
County applied the then recent holding of T.L.O. and held the policy unconstitutional.
The court held the urinalysis “not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
initially justified the interference”, since school policy provided for the exclusion, expulsion or
suspension of students involved in drugs.78 The court also determined that the number of
students referred to drug counseling “compared with the total student body [was] not reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the … urinalysis in the first place.”79 Thus,
the urinalysis violated reasonable privacy expectations of the school children. Furthermore, and
perhaps most important to the disposition of this case, since students under school district policy
face “disciplinary action involving possible imposition of serious sanctions, such as suspension
or expulsion” as a result of drug violations, the comprehensive medical policy was held to violate
students’ due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.80
Since 1995, when Odenheim was decided in the chancery court, the U.S. Supreme Court had
handed down its Vernonia and Earls decisions, which allowed suspicionless drug testing in
schools despite the Fourth Amendment. In 2003, a year after Earls was decided, the New Jersey
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Joye v. Hunterdon, which overturned Odenheim to
allow suspicionless drug testing in New Jersey Schools.81
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The Hunterdon school district in 1997 implemented a policy requiring “all students who
participate in athletic and non-athletic extracurricular activities (defined as any non-credit
activity), or who possess school parking permits” to undergo random drug and alcohol testing.82
Students covered by the policy were required to agree to be randomly tested by urine, saliva or
breath testing. Each week, the vice principal would randomly draw identification numbers from
a box. The parents of selected students were to be notified and permitted to attend the testing.
The urine sample would be provided behind a closed door to minimize any loss of privacy.
Parents would be notified of any positive test results, and an outside laboratory would conduct a
second more accurate test.83
For a first “offense”, the student would be suspended from the extracurricular activities or
parking privileges, and required to undergo a five day drug education program, five counseling
sessions, and pass a subsequent urinalysis. For a second “offense”, the student would be
suspended from extracurricular activities and lose his parking privileges for 60 days, and
required to attend a five day drug education program, ten counseling sessions, and pass a
subsequent urinalysis. The school would also have the right to conduct unannounced tests on
any student who had committed a second offense. Pursuant to federal privacy laws, the school
would maintain the privacy of all records and not share that information with any law
enforcement agency.84
The plaintiffs (the parents of two students and a drug prevention task force member) sued the
school district, seeking to enjoin the continued implementation of the drug-testing program. The
trial court agreed and invalidated the policy over New Jersey’s corollary to the federal Fourth

82

Id. at 573.
Id. at 579-80.
84
Id. at 580-81.
83

29

Joseph Zahner

Suspicionless Searches of Students in Public Schools

Amendment. The appeals court overturned the trial court and the plaintiffs appealed to the New
Jersey Supreme Court.85
Here, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the analysis of the Vernonia decision.
Importantly, it agreed with and applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s emphasis that “[t]he most
significant element in this case is the first we discussed: that the [drug policy] was undertaken in
furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and
tutor of children entrusted to its care.”86 The court discussed Justice Breyer’s concurrence in
Earls, particularly noting the invocation of the doctrine of in loco parentis and the lower
standard for privacy afforded to students. “The law itself recognizes these responsibilities with
the phrase in loco parentis-a phrase that draws its legal force primarily from the needs of
younger students ... and which reflects, not that a child or adolescent lacks an interest in privacy,
but that a child's or adolescent's school-related privacy interest, when compared to the privacy
interests of an adult, has different dimensions.”87 What exactly are those different dimensions?
The New Jersey Supreme Court here was a bit more open, a bit less coy about upholding and
invoking the legitimacy of in loco parentis. “Consistent with those principles, this Court has
observed that “[i]n a limited sense the teacher stands in the parent's place in his relationship to a
pupil under his care and charge, and has such a portion of the powers of the parent over the pupil
as is necessary to carry out his employment.”88 Here, the court agreed that the school district had
“presented a special need to justify the privacy intrusions at issue absent individualized
suspicion, … [and that] the requirement that school officials closely monitor schoolchildren
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contributes to [this court’s] view that students possess diminished privacy expectations,
justifying a special-needs analysis.”89
The special-needs analysis requires, however, that the government have a strong need to
conduct the search in question. In this case, the school district went to some length to
demonstrate a “pervasive” drug problem and provided some anecdotal evidence that the random
drug testing actually reduced drug use among student athletes. Nationwide statistics were
reported as well as personal observations of Hunterdon school staff. For example, the principal
testified “that she ‘personally became aware of two students snorting heroin on school premises’
and that coaches, teachers, and other administrators similarly reported ‘their concern about what
they perceive to be a growing problem.’”90 Maybe the respondents provided sufficient evidence
to indicate the existence of a real problem. But is the random drug test the right answer?
Is the random suspicionless drug testing program effective? The court says yes. First, it cites
the requirement for counseling of students who test positive. Second it cites a study that
suggests that over 50% of students believe “parental disapproval would deter them from illegal
drug use.”91 Third, the court cites four surveys, some of which support random suspicionless
drug testing, and some of which do not.92 While the court acknowledges the mixed results and
incompleteness of the surveys, it applies its own “common sense” and concludes that
“[p]resumably, a school's testing program gains effectiveness as a deterrent only gradually, as
consistent implementation signals to students a new consequence to illicit drug use.”93 The court
concluded that “reasonableness under Article I, paragraph 7 (New Jersey’s analog to the Fourth
Amendment) does not require the Board to wait for a definitive study regarding drug-testing
89
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efficacy before addressing a problem that it already knows affects a sizable number of
students.”94
In dicta, the New Jersey Supreme Court quoted Justice Breyer’ concurrence in Earls,
observing that the Hunterdon program “preserves an option for a conscientious objector.”
Students could refuse testing without facing disciplinary action, like suspension or expulsion.
The student merely would not be able to participate in extracurricular activities or have the
privilege of parking at school.
Thus, New Jersey essentially follows the special-needs jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme
Court in the application of its corollary to the Fourth Amendment to the public schools. The
Joye decision goes a bit further though. In its decision, the court directly reinforced the doctrine
of in loco parentis and the state’s view that school children generally possess a lower legitimate
expectation of privacy.
How then is the Joye decision applied in New Jersey? This is a relatively recent case, so the
application of Joye is not very well developed. However, one case is particularly worth noting.
In 1997 the Gateway Regional High School District implemented a random drug testing policy
very similar to the program at Hunterdon. On November 30, 2009, plaintiff “Clement Q” was
randomly selected for testing. He tested positive for drugs and his parents were notified pursuant
to school policy.95 The parents petitioned the Commissioner to expunge the test results and the
case was referred to an Administrative Law Judge. The ALJ concluded that Gateway's policy
violated N.J.A.C. 6A:16–4.4(b)(2) by failing to provide a description of (1) how students are
randomly selected, (2) the statistical principals underlying the random selection method, (3) the
method of documenting the random selection process, (4) the method “used to ensure
94
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documenting and verifying the random-selection procedure, and (5) “procedures for students or
their parents to challenge a positive result.”96 The ALJ thus held that Gateway’s policy was
“arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable” and ordered the school to expunge the results of
Clement's test. The Commissioner rejected most of the ALJ’s decision, holding that, while some
of the fine points of the description of the random process were not completely in line with the
regulations, the parental recourse provisions were adequate. The commissioner held that
Gateway did not act arbitrarily, unreasonable or capriciously. The parents appealed.
The New Jersey appeals court respected the Commissioner’s decision and held that the
Gateway policy97 was sufficiently compliant with the New Jersey Statute and the Joye decision.
It appears as though random drug testing in New Jersey public schools, at least as applied to
extracurricular activities or other groups that can opt-out of testing, is legal and enforceable.
Both the schools and the courts justify the use of random drug testing as a reasonable means to
address rampant drug use in schools, when the results are not shared with law enforcement, and
the students are not subject to academic or other disciplinary measures.
96

Id.
“On a biweekly basis, a maximum of twenty (20) of the eligible students that sign up for an
athletic team/activity/club/parking shall be tested for illegal drug use. The contractor appointed
by the Board of Education shall conduct testing. Those selected for testing shall be immediately
notified and tested the same day. Students will be given a letter to notify their parent/guardian
each time they are tested. Any eligible student who refuses to be tested, deliberately avoids
testing or alters their specimen will be immediately dropped from the team/activity/parking as
he/she is in violation of the consent agreement signed prior to the season/activity/parking.
Selection and testing shall be done on a biweekly basis. The contractor conducting the random
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student or parent/guardian chooses to challenge a positive result the student or parent/guardian
shall have the option to send a split sample to an approved testing facility of his/her choosing,
utilizing the same screening parameters and levels identified in this policy, at his/her expense.
Consideration will be given to the results of tests run by the student's facility of choice.
Additional testing may be deemed necessary by the administration. The results of the split
specimen are the final results.” Id.
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The legal arguments and legal decisions around government’s “special needs” in the school
setting all revolve around the presumptive efficacy of suspicionless random drug testing. As we
learned in the U.S. Supreme Court cases, the courts essentially ruled that the tests were
reasonable because the proponents believed in the efficacy of the programs to deter drug use
among the covered groups. All believed that the positive effects of drug testing would naturally
spill over to the general school population. To be constitutional, all that was required was some
evidence of a drug problem. The courts assumed that the tests would act as a deterrent or at the
very least help those troubled students who use drugs to get the requisite counseling. At least the
New Jersey Supreme Court, in its Joye decision paid some lip service to looking at the efficacy
of the testing program at Hunterdon.
The question remains, however, whether random suspicionless drug testing is truly effective
at deterring or reducing drug use. If it were not effective, I would argue that the entire
jurisprudence build around this issue is a delusion. If we are to permit public schools to sacrifice
our children’s legitimate expectation of privacy and their right against unreasonable search and
seizure, the search must truly be reasonable. A search that is ineffective or whose scope is outof-whack relative to the legitimate goal of government is a priori unreasonable. If the
suspicionless search is ineffective in deterring or treating drug abuse in schools, then such a
search is in fact unreasonable.
The Effectiveness of Suspicionless Searches
What do we know about the true effectiveness of suspicionless searches toward the goal of
reducing and preventing illicit drug use in schools? In the Joye decision, the Hunterdon district
presented evidence, albeit mostly anecdotal, to convince the court that its program worked. The
court in Joye applied the tripartite test derived from the line of cases beginning with T.L.O.,
34
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examining “the affected students' expectation of privacy, the search's degree of obtrusiveness,
and the strength of the government's asserted need in conducting the search.”98 If the search fails
to have any efficacy in addressing the special needs of the government, then I would argue such
an intrusion is overly obtrusive relative to the information gleaned, and the search is
unconstitutional. The court in Joye, however, does not believe that effectiveness and
reasonableness are related, and rendered its decision despite unclear and conflicting evidence.99
What evidence did Hunterdon provide regarding efficacy? First, the school board presented
“a 1996 statewide survey showing that over fifty percent of responding students stated that
parental disapproval would deter them from illegal drug use.” Hunterdon then argued, since
parents would be notified of the results of the drug test, the students would stay clean.100
Second, Hunterdon provided a 2002 study, the Dupont Study101, which stated “all of the school
officials surveyed strongly supported their entire [student drug testing] programs and all were
convinced that their [student drug testing] programs benefited their entire school communities,
including the students.” 102 Third, Hunterdon presented the McKinney Study103, which stated
that “[r]andom drug testing policies appear to provide a strong tool for schools to use in the
battle to reduce alcohol and drug usage among teens .... [T]his study does show that random drug

98

Joye at 597 (emphasis added).
“Reasonableness in this context does not require that the Board possess irrefutable proof
verifying the efficacy of random drug and alcohol testing in reducing substance abuse among
students. Rather, it is enough that the Board believed that its program would have some
measurable effect in attaining the Board's objectives.” Id. at 603.
100
Id. at 604.
101
Robert L. DuPont, et al., Report of a Preliminary Study: Elements of a Successful SchoolBased Student Drug Testing Program, July 22, 2002, available at www.datia.org/pdf_
resources/prelim_study.pdf (Apr. 15, 2003) (DuPont Study).
102
Joye at 604-605.
103
Joseph R. McKinney, The Effectiveness and Legality of Random Drug Testing Policies, at 3
available at www.studentdrugtesting.org/Effectiveness.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2003)
(McKinney Study).
99

35

Joseph Zahner

Suspicionless Searches of Students in Public Schools

testing policies are effective in reducing the temptation to use drugs and alcohol.”104 Fourth,
Hunterdon presented the Saturn Study105, which compared Oregon schools with a suspicionless
drug testing program with other Oregon schools that did not. That study showed that the “school
that drug-tested student athletes had a rate of illicit drug use that was about one-fourth that of the
control school …. [Despite] warning[s] that there were limitations to their study, the authors
concluded that ‘[a] policy of random drug testing surveillance appears to have significantly
reduced recent drug use among adolescent athletes.’”106 Finally, Hunterdon, in a fit of equitable
conduct, presented the Michigan Study107, a survey of 76,000 students nationwide, which found
that “drug testing (of any kind) was not a significant predictor of student marijuana use in the
past 12 months.”108 Taken together, these proffered studies do not provide compelling statistical
or scientific evidence of the effectiveness of suspicionless drug testing. In fact, the only large
national study offered to the court (the Michigan Study) indicated that suspicionless drug testing
had no positive effect on drug use by students.
The New Jersey Supreme Court had the benefit of two extensive studies, Goldberg and
Yamaguchi, but unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court did not have that advantage. Vernonia
and Earls were both decided before any systematic studies were conducted exploring the
effectiveness of random suspicionless drug testing in schools. Those decisions did, however,
encourage the federal government to support drug testing programs in schools.
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The courts in Vernonia and Earls applied a certain “common sense” in their decision to
permit suspicionless searches in public schools. Anecdotal evidence and the opinion of
administrators were presented as “evidence” of the need for testing and the effectiveness of the
testing. The court held that the searches were reasonable, because the school had acted
reasonably in presupposing that random drug testing would be effective. Combined with the
seriousness of the special needs, the court held the searches to be constitutional. But is drug
testing in schools efficacious?
Two peer reviewed and controlled academic studies were undertaken on the heels of Earls to
measure just that. Yamaguchi, Johnston and O’Malley of the University of Michigan conducted
the first major study in 2003109. In that study, the researchers asked four questions. What
percentage of schools tested students for drugs and alcohol? Which students do the testing cover?
What is the relationship between testing and actual use? Data was collected from the Monitoring
the Future (MTF) study of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, information provided by school
administrations, and the Youth, Education & Society (YES) questionnaire. The study was large,
spanning from 1998 through 2001 and including 30,000 eighth graders from 260 schools, 23,000
tenth graders from 227 schools, and 23,000 twelfth graders from 235 schools.
Only a minority of schools at that time administered drug testing of any kind. In 2001,
according to this study, 18.14% of schools, representing 19.23% of students had drug testing of
any kind, suspicion-based or random drug testing. 14.04% of schools, representing 14.07% of
students, had a suspicion-based program. 3.30% of schools, representing 2.81% of students, had
a random drug testing program covering students participating in extracurricular activities.
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4.95% of schools, representing 5.68% of students, had a random drug test program covering only
athletes.
Interestingly, the results of this large cross-sectional study indicated that drug testing of any
kind was not a significant predictor of student drug use. The take home from this study suggests
that drug testing for any student is not a significant predictor of marijuana use in the past twelve
months. Drug testing of athletes was also found not to be a significant predictor of marijuana use
for those athletes. Drug testing of any kind (including testing for cause) of “experienced”
marijuana users (those having smoked at least 20 times prior to the study) was also found not to
be a significant predictor of marijuana use. Finally, drug testing of any kind was found to not be
a significant predictor of other illicit drug use. It is important to keep in mind that this study,
which was designed as a cross sectional analysis, cannot be used to make causal assumptions. In
other words, the results can be used to assess correlations and hence have predictive value, but
they do not tell us whether drug testing causes a change in behavior of the students.
In another 2003 study, Goldberg and colleagues conducted an experiment using a handful of
Oregon public schools.110 18 high schools were divided into two groups. The control group
consisted of those schools that deferred the implementation of a random drug testing program.
The experimental group consisted of those schools implementing a suspicionless random drug
test program covering students participating in extracurricular activities. Positive drug tests
could not result in academic or legal punishment, but students could be suspended from the
extracurricular activities. The drug test results were kept confidential, but parents were notified
of their children’s positive results. Counseling was prescribed for those students who tested
positive.
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Students in both groups were administered a 121-question survey that asked about students’
use and perceptions of drugs. The survey was administered five times to each student over the
course of the study. Both the control and the experimental groups showed the same baseline
level of drug and alcohol use. The establishment of a baseline and the assignment of a control
and experimental group was important in establishing this study as a prospective study that can
tease-out cause and effect relationships.
This study showed that there was essentially no effect on drug use by students due to the
implementation of random drug testing. Drug testing had no effect on past month illicit drug
use, past month illicit drug and alcohol use, and past year illicit drug and alcohol use. The one
exception was the effect of testing on past year illicit drug use (not combined with alcohol use)
in two of the five surveys, where a slight but nonetheless significant negative effect on drug use
was seen.
The study also looked at several mediating effects on drug use that could be affected by the
random drug test. For example, the random testing had no effect on the either the retention or
attrition of student athletes on sports teams, but did have a negative effect on their belief in their
athletic competence. Surprisingly, random drug testing had a negative effect on students’
attitudes regarding drug use. Students in the experimental group believed less in the benefits of
drug testing, believed less in the authority’s opposition to drug use, and believed less that drug
testing was a reason not to use drugs.
Since the Supreme Court held random suspicionless drug testing in public schools
constitutional, the federal government has become interested in helping schools develop testing
programs, with the hope of reducing student drug use. In 2003, the U.S. Department of
Education’s Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS) instituted a grant program to

39

Joseph Zahner

Suspicionless Searches of Students in Public Schools

support mandatory random student drug testing (MRSDT) programs in schools. Since that time,
tens of millions of dollars have been given to schools; with the average grant size of $160,000
per school.
In 2007, the U.S. Department of Education initiated a study to examine whether this is
money well spent.111 The National Center for Education Evaluation looked at 36 high schools
that had received the federal grants. Depending on the parameters measured, about 1,500 to
3,000 students participated in the study. The study examined whether the drug testing programs
deterred drug use, or had any spill-over effect to students that were not covered. The study also
looked at negative effects of the testing programs. After baseline data collection, half the
schools were assigned to the treatment group, which implemented an MRSDT program, and half
to the control group, which deferred implementation of the MRSDT program until after the data
was collected.
As a starting proposition, this study reported that 47% of students report having used illicit
drugs and 72% reported using alcohol. The government’s position is that drug and alcohol use
among children is a leading cause of health problems, low academic outcomes, delinquency, and
risky sexual behavior.
This study did show a limited and minor effect of testing on student reported drug testing, but
showed no spill-over effect. Specifically, the MRSDT experimental group showed a 5.5%
reduction (p < 0.05) in students reporting using any tested drug within the past thirty days. This
however was the only significant effect noted in the entire study. While there were trends
showing an effect of about 2.5% to 5.8% reduction for some reported drug use parameters, none
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were statistically significant. Those parameters measured included reporting use within the past
6 months of any substance, any substance except alcohol and tobacco, and any substance test by
the district’s MRSDT program; and reporting use within the past 30 days of any substance, and
any substance except alcohol and tobacco.
Regarding the all-important spill over effects, this study showed absolutely no effect on
students’ intentions to use drugs in the future and no change in the perceived consequences of
substance abuse. There was also no effect on the number of disciplining incidents between
control and experimental schools.
Just as important as measuring any positive effects the testing may cause, this study also
examined whether the random testing had a negative effect on students or their relationship to
the school. Drug testing was found to have no effect on students’ reported attitudes toward
school, students’ perception of their connectedness to the school, or participation in
extracurricular activities. Furthermore, it had no effect, positive or negative, toward drug use.
Not to be out done, a research group from Fairleigh Dickinson University examined the
effects of suspicionless random drug testing in suburban New Jersey in a study published in
2013.112 This study ran from the 2006-7 school year through the 2012-13 school year and
followed students from grade seven through twelve. The treatment school comprised students
opting into a random drug testing program, in which all students are tested. One control school
only tested for drugs on a suspicion basis. The other control school randomly tested only
athletes. Control and treatment schools were in the same district with near identical
demographics. Students were given a 25-question survey designed to examine students’
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relationships to their parents, use of alcohol, aspirational use of alcohol, and reported use and
aspirational use of illicit drugs.
Like the earlier studies, the treatment did not show significant differences between the
treatment group and the controls. An important parameter measured was the student’s likelihood
of having a conversation with a parent. The working model was that parents have the greatest
effect on reducing drug use by their children by talking about the negative effects of drugs and
their disapproval of drug use by their children. Here, the drug-testing program had no effect on
the likelihood that a child would have that all-important conversation with a parent.
The spillover effects of random testing, and the perception of safety and drug and alcohol use
was also examined. Here, the treatment had no significant effect on the perceived use and safety
of drugs and alcohol. No spill-over effects were observed from random drug testing.
The study did however show a minimal effect on rising eighth graders. Those seventh
graders who were actually tested showed a mean reduction of 6 points in the likelihood of using
alcohol in the eighth grade. The researchers hypothesized, while clearly disappointed that
random testing did not work as expected, that testing merely 30-40% of students in a school
might be to blame for the failure. They hypothesized, without any data to support the
hypothesis, that perhaps 60% or more of students would need to be tested to see any spill-over
effects and an actual reduction in drug use.
On the whole, it appears as though common sense once again misleads the courts. What is
believed to be reasonable and what is actually true, the scientific method tells us, is not
necessarily the same thing.
The collision between the historical doctrine of in loco parentis and the modern application
of fundamental constitutional rights to children in the classroom forced a compromise.
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Government has an important interest, standing in loco parentis, to reduce drug use among
children and to promote the health, well being and education of our children. Children have a
reduced expectation of privacy under the care of their parents and under the care of their schools.
Schools therefore are allowed to test our children without suspicion and without probable cause,
because (the courts assume) random drug testing is a reasonable means to address the problem.
Let us ask ourselves these questions. Is it reasonable to subject children to the humiliation of
urinalysis, to the stigma of drug counseling, to the false promise of a constitutional right to
privacy and against unreasonable search and seizure based on an unfounded belief and anecdote?
Maybe. Is it reasonable to do so when scientific peer reviewed studies teach us that the random
tests do not solve the problem? Clearly the answer is no. What if the taxpayers must foot the
bill for drug tests, expensive confirmatory drug tests, and student counseling, when the positive
repercussions are not there? Definitely no.
The social science research tells us that parents have the greatest effect on children’s attitude
toward drugs and alcohol and their use of alcohol and drugs. I suggest that the government
spend more money on research directed to understanding the social dynamics of drug use among
children, and seek to find a workable solution. The courts could then apply a dose of reality to
the important government interest, instead of applying “reason” and “common sense” detached
from any measurable sense of reality. Even if we apply in loco parentis to the public schools,
and completely eliminate any lip service to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, we should ask ourselves whether a parent would subject his child to a random
urinalysis to deter drug use? Most likely not, especially when the parent knows that a frank
conversation is proven to be more effective.
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When the courts revisit this issue again, perhaps when a school is challenged for randomly
testing all students, they should apply the reason of reality, divined through the scientific
method. The courts should hold suspicionless drug testing unreasonable in view of the important
government interest in ameliorating drug use, and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
A Vignette
Sparta High School, a large high school in an affluent semi-rural community in Sussex
County, New Jersey, decided that it had a major drug problem. Rumors in the community stated
that heroin use was near epidemic proportions. Pot deals were going down on campus. The
parents and school board were rightfully concerned. Naturally, the parents wanted the school to
do whatever it could to help them protect their children.
On June 12, 2007 the Sparta school board approved a program, which would subject any
student, who participated in extracurricular activities and parked on campus, to random drug
testing. Other students could participate with the consent of a parent. Sparta would be the first
school in Sussex County to enact such a program, and join the approximately twenty other
districts across New Jersey that have such a program at that time. The program was slated to go
into effect for the 2007-2008 school year.113
Today, Sparta has yet to put its random drug-testing program in place. In August of 2007,
one month before the proposed random testing program was to be activated, New Jersey
proposed new rules regulating student drug testing, which would have impacted the
implementation of the proposed testing. The Sparta school district delayed the program under
the advice of their attorney. When the new school board convened in late April of 2008, they
voted to delay the random drug testing indefinitely. Their reasoning, according to Sparta board
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president Kevin Pollison, “[A]ny new drug-test policy would be challenged in court, and now is
not the time for Sparta to get sued over it.”
At least parents in Sparta have a choice. If they want their child tested for drugs in school,
they can shell-out $15,000 per year to send their child to Pope John School, or $35,000 per year
for nearby Blair Academy. Those schools would be happy to test your child for drugs.
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